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“Redrawing Maps, Manipulating
Demographics: On Exchange of Populated
Territories and Self-Determination”∗
Timothy William Waters

Abstract
Anyone reading Yuval Shany’s response to my article, “The Blessing of Departure—Exchange
of Populated Territories The Lieberman Plan as an Abstract Exercise in Demographic Transformation,” would hardly characterize it as “agreement.” In part this is because Shany builds his case
by assuming I am saying something about self-determination that misses—at least misplaces—my
real point. This is unfortunate, both as it masks the fact that Shany and I actually agree transfers
can be legal, and it distracts attention from the points of real, substantive disagreement. The misreading is not an accident, rather the product of a patterned view. The points of disagreement,
center on: whether transfer is a harm per se; whether the presence of a minority affects the state’s
power to transfer; whether there is a positive right not to be denationalized; and whether there is a
hierarchy of rights.

∗

Sincere thanks to Prof. Yuval Shany, whose thoughtful response prompted this reply, and Rachel
Guglielmo. Comments to tiwaters@indiana.edu.
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A DIFFERENT DEPARTURE:
A REPLY TO SHANY’S “REDRAWING MAPS,
MANIPULATING DEMOGRAPHICS:
ON EXCHANGE OF POPULATED TERRITORIES
AND SELF-DETERMINATION”
Timothy William Waters*
I. A DIFFERENT READING
Halfway into his excellent and forceful response, it turns out Yuval
Shany agrees with me: “This does not mean, however, that the State
of Israel cannot cede land or even, in theory, denationalize part of its
citizenry…. [T]he legality of such moves would need to be grounded
in the state’s general sovereign powers.”1 So states can transfer
territory and denationalize citizens, consistent with human rights: this
is, almost exactly, my argument too.
Still, anyone reading Shany’s response would hardly characterize
it as “agreement.” In part this is because Shany builds his case by
assuming I am saying something about self-determination that
misses—at least misplaces—my real point. This is unfortunate, both
as it masks the fact that Shany and I actually agree transfers can be
legal, and it distracts attention from the points of real, substantive
disagreement. I will say something later about this misreading—not
an accident, rather the product of a patterned view—but I think it better
*

Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington).
Sincere thanks to Prof. Yuval Shany, whose thoughtful response prompted this
reply, and Rachel Guglielmo. Comments to tiwaters@indiana.edu.
1
Yuval Shany, Redrawing Maps, Manipulating Demographics: On Exchange
of Populated Territories and Self-Determination, 2 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS 286, 301
(2008) (and 303, using similar language in conclusion).
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to address the points of disagreement, which center on these things:
• whether transfer is a harm per se;
• whether the presence of a minority affects the state’s
power to transfer;
• whether there is a positive right not to be
denationalized; and
• whether there is a hierarchy of rights.
These are questions about how to characterize doctrine, but they
also reveal different normative commitments concerning citizenship
and states, and—considered together with our real disagreement
about self-determination—say something troubling about what, for
convenience, we may call “cosmopolitanism.”

II. DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES:
FOUR OBJECTIONS, ONE ASSUMPTION
Our agreement is limited. Even though he acknowledges that transfers
are possible (a view already beyond what some scholars admit), Shany
thinks this transfer—the Lieberman Plan—is clearly illegal. Some of his
reasons are anticipated, and answered, in my article,2 so here I consider
only certain objections that indicate a deeper divergence: These include
the real risk doctrine, the right of option, and the claim that I construct
an impermissible hierarchy with sovereign control of territory trumping
rights. These objections fail, but more importantly, the ways in which
they fail share a common defect: an assumption that a state polity has an
essential, even moral, integrity.
2

Shany lists rights that transfer violates, but I show that, because these rights gain
content through membership in a polity (which is grounded in afﬁnities arising from
residence in a particular place), a transfer of territory also transfers to the new sovereign
responsibility for those rights. Likewise, he claims the Plan’s discriminatory raison
d’être disqualiﬁes it, but I show how states in fact have broad latitude to circumvent
this demonstrably porous prohibition, as the Plan does by targeting territory in the
name of preserving (Jewish) democracy.
http://www.bepress.com/lehr/vol2/iss1/art11
DOI: 10.2202/1938-2545.1023
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A. REAL RISK, BUT TO WHAT?
Shany and I agree that states normally have the right to transfer
territory and denationalize citizens. A human rights claim would
trump that—Shany and I agree on this too—but only if the state’s
action would constitute a violation. So, would it?
Saying yes, Shany invokes the “real risk” doctrine: Transfer is
invalid because it creates a real risk that transferees’ human rights would
be violated. Citizens of wealthy, rights-respecting Israel would join
impoverished, violent Palestine: Health care would decline, repression
increase.3 Shany’s objection relies on current levels of rights in the West
Bank, but nothing in the Plan—or the idea of transfer—requires us to
assume that any individual will necessarily be subjected to treatment
that in the absence of transfer would constitute a violation. Even if the
doctrine barred placing individuals in worse situations, that would still
allow a broad category of transfers: It would be interesting to consider
Shany’s response if Lieberman proposed transferring Umm el Fahm to,
say, Norway. Real risk doctrine might prohibit a particular transfer, but
it is wholly inapposite to analyzing changes in sovereignty as a general
category; it is not a bar to this kind of thing.
But this presents a problem for Shany, since he also says that the
Arabs’ loss of Israeli citizenship and community with other Israelis
violates their human rights. Indeed, it seems clear that Shany’s real
objection is not to the harmful loss of health services or education, but
to the transfer itself, which severs common bonds of citizenship and
identity. That kind of harm springs not from any discrete violation
by or shortcoming of the receiving sovereign—which is what real
risk doctrine normally contemplates4—but as a function of transfer
3

Not to mention that, of course, transferees would also be subjected to an illegal
occupation.
4
Real risk doctrine has been applied almost exclusively to cases of extradition
or deportation in which individuals faced speciﬁc harm, such as torture, or suffered
a speciﬁc medical condition requiring treatment. It has never been applied to a
generalized denationalization resulting from a transfer of sovereignty.
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

3

Law & Ethics of Human Rights, Vol. 2 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 11

itself. If he is right, transfer causes an absolute harm by the very act
of changing borders.
This argument proves too much: If it were right, there could never
be a legitimate transfer, since all transfers break existing political
communities. But transfer is possible– we agree on that—and in the
postwar era many states have formed from other, existing states without
anyone suggesting that their varying ability to realize progressive
human rights—or their sundering of existing political communities5—
constituted a violation of human rights.6
Some transfers may harm individuals, and sometimes that harm
may violate human rights. But the only things all transfers do are
move borders and change citizenship; the real risk of transfer is to the
integrity of an existing political community.
B. CONSTRUCTING MINORITY STATUS:
There is something curious in the attempt to elevate the bare fact
of common citizenship—itself a function of where borders happen
to be— into an absolute bar against changing those borders. This
is especially clear, and troubling, if we consider the weight placed

5

Citizens have the right to travel about, and live within, their state. But Shany’s
claim that transfer violates this right is at odds with state practice: Slovenes can no
longer move to Belgrade, or Belarusians to Samarkand—and nobody frames this as a
“violation.” When the territory of a state changes, the scope of mobility changes too.
It cannot be—as a logical matter or a legal one—that the right to move within a state
determines the shape of that state: the right is coextensive with the state’s territory
whatever it happens to be.
6
Some examples: partition of British India; withdrawal of Singapore from
Malaysia; independence of Algeria; independence of East Pakistan; dissolutions of
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; division of Czechoslovakia; separation of Eritrea
and Ethiopia. For Shany, dissolution is inapposite, since “the creation of new states…
do[es] not involve denationalization.” (Shany, supra note 1, at 307). This is doctrinal
formalism: While it is notionally possible for a state’s authority to dissolve, following
a plague or natural disaster, say, in the actual cases we call dissolution, there was no
precipitating collapse, rather the act of secession itself signaled dissolution.
http://www.bepress.com/lehr/vol2/iss1/art11
DOI: 10.2202/1938-2545.1023
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on protecting the Arabs’ minority status. Shany argues that transfer
would break this minority into two groups, violating the rights both
of those cut off from Israel and those left behind in it. But the Israeli
Arab minority is not some autochthonous, primordial organism; it is,
in the ﬁrst instance, a construct of the Israeli frontier. Arabs on one
side are members of the minority, those on the other subjects of the
occupation—and claimants to Palestinian statehood. With different
borders, Israel’s Arab minority might be its majority;7 with different
borders, any given member of that minority might be, well, just another
Arab in the West Bank. The difference is the border.8
Where a group exists, deﬁnitionally, because of a border, I do not
think there is doctrinal or even logical support for the proposition that
the group’s rights are violated by that border’s revision.9 Minority
status is a residual and remedial category; no one afﬁrmatively wishes
to be a minority for its own sake. So it is curious to construct that status
as something absolute that shapes the state rather than being shaped
by the state, indeed made necessary by it. Still, that he maintains
otherwise, positing an essential, irreducible identity for Arabs qua
minority—and it is worth remembering, a minority in relation to
7

Transfer does destroy Arabs’ minority status—by making them members of
the neighboring state’s majority. Would we reject a single state in Cisjordan on the
grounds that it would destroy Israeli Arabs’ minority identity?
8
This is not to deny difference and complexity within Cisjordanian ArabPalestinian society, nor the common frames of reference Israeli Arabs uniquely share
after 60 years. See, e.g., Ali Haider, Arabs Here to Stay: ‘Population Exchange Notion
Leaves Arab-Israelis No Choice but to Seek World’s Help, YNETNEWS.COM, Aug. 24,
2007, available at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3441007,00.html (last
visited Dec. 6, 2007) (“the Arab population in Israel is one national group whose
social and cultural formulation since 1948 enjoys collective aspects”). But neither
should we deny other frames of reference, nor the decisive role of borders in deﬁning
and maintaining categories of difference.
9
I know of no border revision or new state rejected on the grounds that it changed the
composition of a minority. A similar proposition was rejected by the Badinter Commission,
which did not view divisions introduced among Yugoslavia’s ethnicities as an obstacle to
formation of new states, thoughit did require those new states to respect minority rights.
Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion 2, 31 I.L.M. 1497 (1992).
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
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what?—suggests how central the defense of a common polity is for
Shany. And he proposes other means to defend it.
C. A RIGHT OF OPTION?
Arguments about the irrelevance of rights would fail if there were
a positive right to retain one’s citizenship. And Shany says there is: a
“right of option” that allows affected populations to choose between
citizenship in the new state or the old.
Here again, state practice suggests there is no such right: Among
all the examples noted before of states that were newly constituted or
changed their frontiers, none accorded an option—and no one described
those as human rights violations. Indeed, examining Shany’s argument,
the evidence is thin—two agreements allowing ex gratia retention of
citizenship10—and the principal engine for his claim is bare preference:
This is a good thing that he feels ought to be a law. And while this might
be a good and generous thing—after all, who does not want options?—
we must acknowledge a corollary: Granting an option to the Arabs in
effect denies the “option of departure” for the Jews—departure, that is,
not in a physical sense, but from the project of a community. A right of
option is a veto on changing the polity; it constructs citizenship as an
almost indissoluble—indeed, inescapable—category.
D. WHOSE HIERARCHY?
So who gets an option: the state or its people? Supposedly, I
create a hierarchy with “human rights…subordinated to the political
conﬁguration of the state, which is, in turn, governed by the right to selfdetermination.”11 But this in no way follows from my argument, which is
about the scope of rights. A transfer that violated human rights would be
void—but no right is implicated. Certain rights are instantiated through
10

Neither agreement—the 2000 Treaty of Jeddah nor the ICJ ruling in
Bakassi—suggests any obligation to grant an option.
11
Shany, supra note 1, at 303.
http://www.bepress.com/lehr/vol2/iss1/art11
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the state—they acquire speciﬁc form through application in a speciﬁc
state. This does not imply subordination—though it does suggest what
my argument indeed says: that human rights do not speak to changes in
sovereign control over territory. They are silent on this question.
It may jar one’s cosmopolitan sensibilities to think that human
rights—which aim to pierce the fetish-veil of sovereignty—might have
little to say about such an important issue as transfer of sovereignty, and
I hardly expect this brief reply to sway any minds not convinced by the
full paper. One’s disposition towards the uncomfortable but important
idea that universal human rights often gain meaning in particular social
contexts largely determines one’s receptivity to this kind of argument.
Such arguments cannot be won, only described and motivated. But I
will have more to say about that disposition in the ﬁnal section.
One more thing this question of “option” suggests: because it would
deny individuals the means to reconstitute their polity, it is in effect
the right of option that would create a hierarchy—but one that places
at its apex the citizenry as a totality—which is to say, the state.

III. FLUX AND CONVERGENCE:
SOVEREIGN DEMOCRACY DOES
WHAT SELF-DETERMINATION DOESN’T
I should now address that distracting misinterpretation I mentioned.
Shany assumes I am making a kind of straight-line attack to show
that self-determination affords a right of ethnic secession from
existing states. I am not, because, just like Shany, I do not think it
does. I completely agree that the lex lata—which one could look up in
Brownlie12 or Higgins13 or Cassese14—does not allow ethnic secession.
12

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 490 (6th ed. 2003)
Rosalyn Higgins, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession: Comments,
in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30, 32 (Catherine Broelmann et al.,
ed., 1993)
14
ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 334
(1995).
13

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
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Were I writing a different paper, I would cite Shany as a compact and
efﬁcient treatment of this fairly obvious truth.
But my argument is built on something entirely different—
something with which Shany agrees: the broad powers democratic
majorities have in sovereign states to alter their borders and reconstitute
their citizenship. This is not self-determination: I state clearly that
this process, if described as self-determination, is not supported by
international law. Indeed, if I am right that all his other objections fail,
then the only way left for Shany to object to the Plan is precisely to
characterize it as an improper act of self-determination.
And this is where, I suspect, the most profound disagreement Shany
and I have arises—the thing motivating his peculiar misreading: that
a democratic majority altering Israel’s borders would look curiously
like the outcome if one applied classical self-determination; that this
functional convergence is not an accident; and that we might need to
take this seriously.
Whenever two distinct doctrinal approaches—one compatible
with existing norms, the other contravening them—lead to one
outcome, we ﬁnd ourselves at a moment of ﬂux, of opportunity:
the doctrines’ functional equivalence suggests their fungibility, and
thus a moment for re-evaluation. In this case, two doctrines present
themselves: a sovereign majoritarian transfer of territory, and an act
of self-determination. One is consistent with current norms, the other
heterodox, yet they lead to an identical outcome. A candid observer
must admit that the logic of self-determination more meaningfully
represents the motives of the actors: Sovereign majoritarianism
describes a process, but does not supply meaning; it tells us nothing
about why a population might choose to organize itself in a certain
way, which is precisely what self-determination does tell us.
What I argue, in other words, is that while current self-determination
rules bar reconstitution of states, that proscription rests on a doctrinally
unstable basis, is inconsistent with our other normative commitments,
and vitiates efforts to motivate democratic outcomes; in the harsh
circumstances of Cisjordan, it may be bad policy to boot. So I indeed
http://www.bepress.com/lehr/vol2/iss1/art11
DOI: 10.2202/1938-2545.1023
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conclude that self-determination—the secession of Israel’s Jews—
could prove normatively defensible (and if it could, it would seem
strange to limit self-determination to groups that happen to be electoral
majorities in current state borders). But that it is not “supported by
positive international law”15 today: Shany and I agree on that. It is not
law—despite this compelling convergence—precisely because of the
kind of commitment Shany’s argument represents: commitment to a
curiously strident cosmopolitanism.

IV. COSMOPOLITAN DEPARTURES
Shany follows, indeed represents, one of the best and most humane
traditions in Israeli thinking, and so what there is of criticism here
arises because we speak, not so much of a particular man’s view, but
of a way of thinking like his. And precisely because it is a humane
tradition, it is all the more troubling to observe its descent into
formalism, its deformation away from the unmediated embrace of the
human and towards something else.
Shany does not deny that groups within the state experience
strains, but believes they “should negotiate some inter-communal
modus vivendi (or a friendly divorce), or strive to create a new civic
identity, which transcends ethnic lines.”16 The problem, of course,
is all those unhappy marriages where no divorce is possible. In the
real world, majorities seldom let minorities leave; why should they,
when—precisely because of the democratic process—they hold the
dominant position? When the party holding the power, resources
and a voting majority feels disinclined to divorce, under the existing
doctrinal framework there is no recourse at all. This does not seem
like any better a policy for communities than for couples.
But the practical impossibility of divorce is evidently irrelevant—
what matters far more is defense of a polity committed to (at least
acquiescent in) the project of co-existence. There is an element of
15
16

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
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formalism, even fantasy, in the policy arguments underpinning this
commitment. Consider this key defense of the existing state as the
ﬁnal vessel of national aspiration:
[T]he “locking in” of different groups within a single
polity provides the State with relative permanence and
stability and conveys to the different ethnic groups
within the State the idea that, from an international
perspective, they share a single national identity and,
perhaps, a common destiny.17
Quite apart from one’s preferences, does this descriptively,
empirically satisfy? Does anyone think that Arabs and Jews actually
share a “single national identity”?18 If they did, there would be
little debate about the “problem” of keeping Israel democratic and
Jewish. As for stability—the great contribution of international law’s
conservatism, Shany tells us—well: I have never heard that word
applied to the land west of the Jordan.
The idea of creating a transcendent, civic identity assumes the
irrelevance, even undesirability, of ethnic identity, and we should at
least admit that this is a difﬁcult claim to make in the face of real
human beings who disagree. Leaving this aside, creating a civic
identity is problematic enough in a state organized on secular lines,
but Israel is an expressly Jewish project, which begs the question of
which group has to do the transcending.
From the beginning, the creation of Israel has also been a project
of exclusion, actual and deﬁnitional. Israel has offered citizenship
to all within its borders, but made discretionary choices about who,
precisely, is allowed within them. To this day Israel has not ﬁxed
its frontiers (as for their part Palestinians have never recognized the

17

Id. at 11.
The inﬁxation “perhaps” suggests Shany cannot bring himself to say Arabs and
Jews have “a common destiny”’
18

http://www.bepress.com/lehr/vol2/iss1/art11
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borders, or existence, of Israel); Cisjordan is a contested land, not one
whose constitutional moment is past.
What is occurring today in Cisjordan is a process of division.
The principle of two states—and their inevitability—has been
conceded; we are only haggling about borders. A place of division is
unpromising and quixotic ground on which to prove a cosmopolitan
claim; I think this is why the attempt turns to abstraction as the only
way to sustain its insistence on common identity. Shany defends
orthodox self-determination because it “simpliﬁes the difﬁcult task
of identifying the ‘people’” and “circumvents the ‘minority within a
minority’ conundrum.”19 But self-identiﬁed communities—and the
“conundrums” they create—do not go away just because we declare
that their state deﬁnes their aspirations.
“Locking in” works—except where it doesn’t. Unfortunately,
“doesn’t” covers a great many places for which our present doctrine
has no answer; worse, though it springs from humane and cosmopolitan
impulses, it provides inapposite, distracting answers positively
harmful to other liberal values. Nowhere do we ﬁnd consideration—I
am not speaking of sympathy—for the fact that not “giving up on
co-existence”20 does not merely call individuals to higher ideals, but
requires them to do what they do not wish to do. He speaks of options,
but Shany is compelling these communities to stay together. What
exactly is the rationale for that? The Arabs may not want to leave,21
but Lieberman does—is his only option emigration?22

19

Shany, supra note 1, at 292.
Id. at 299.
21
What would happen if Israel’s Arabs demanded separation (not implausible,
given the complexity of Israeli Arab identity)? Doctrinally, there would be no change,
but objections about real risk and right of option would collapse, and all that would be
left is the core of Shany’s argument: dividing a polity is simply a per se harm.
22
Since Lieberman is a relatively recent immigrant, this might be a pleasingly
ironic solution. But of course this does not satisfy nearly so well for the sabra, for
whom the contours of coexistence were determined by wars and decisions of state—
including the Law of Return by which Lieberman ﬁnds himself in Israel, a citizen.
20

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
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We should be clear that “giving up,” is, in other terms, simply
the reconstitution of political units to accord more closely with their
members’ desires. Why is this so threatening? The insistence that
borders cannot be changed by the minority, the majority, or anyone
unless everyone agrees, reveals a kind of atavistic commitment to the
state—and this is a curious commitment to ﬁnd in a cosmopolitan
argument. Somehow, a project of civic identity has transmuted into
fetishization of the particular civic identities we happen to have.
Cosmopolitanism was not supposed to end in the strangulation of
political choice; it was certainly not supposed to end in the apotheosis
of the state. But this is where Shany, and those who think this way,
have arrived: at the conﬂation of human rights with citizenship; at the
absolute defense of borders as inviolate normative commitments; at the
insistence that, where there is dissatisfaction with a civic community,
the only solution is to lock it in.
And there is something else: It turns out Shany actually accepts
the idea of ethnic self-determination, so long as it happens in the past.
For Shany, communities enjoy a constitutional moment in which selfdetermination is perfected; such a moment happened at the creation of
Israel. This view, which justiﬁes Israel as an act of self-determination,
but then forever closes that opportunity—to the Palestinians within the
state; to the Palestinians under occupation;23 to the Palestinians who
missed the moment because they had become refugees; to the Jews
themselves—reveals a feature that, one would think, cosmopolitanism
would not demonstrate: not simply how harsh, nor how abstract it is,
but how selective.
...

23

Shany says the Plan offends because it “interfere[s] with the external boundaries
and the demographic makeup of the State of Israel and the nascent Palestinian polity—
that is, tampering with the territorial integrity of both states.” Shany, supra note 1,
at 297. Presumably, this implies Israel’s abandonment of all claims in the occupied
territories, including East Jerusalem, and evacuation of all settlers. I do not know his
actual view.
http://www.bepress.com/lehr/vol2/iss1/art11
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Perhaps I am wrong about the Lieberman Plan. It is troubling
to imagine these scraps of land forced into Palestine against the
inhabitants’ will—complex as that “will” is—just as it is troubling
to imagine peoples forced to live together even though, for complex
reasons, they no longer wish to. This hardly would be an interesting
case if it were not a hard one; it is entirely possible that, on this or that
doctrinal point, Shany is right about the Plan crossing lines, violating
rights, failing tests.
But what makes the Plan so intriguing as a case is precisely that it
invokes that rare thing: a claim by the majority to divide the state. It is
this majoritarian element that allows us to explore the contours of the
forbidden logic of self-determination. The reconceptualization of selfdetermination I describe is an attempt to develop a normative response
to claims of identity and community, and to the evident strains they
can create within a polity.
I think the Lieberman Plan presents a profoundly disturbing case.
But my stated point and purpose are to consider the Plan as an instance
of a more general phenomenon, and I see no reasoned objection to
transfers in general. Indeed, for all he says, Shany all but agrees this
kind of thing can happen, and does. He does not like it—more than his
speciﬁc objections, his sensibility makes this clear—but why exactly?
Clearly he is concerned to protect human rights—and this out of the
most liberal instincts—but his response is to identify the rights of
individuals in a way that places a nearly absolute priority on the state
itself. We may argue about a particular case—we might even agree—
but where defense of rights becomes, in effect, defense of the state,
we must ask ourselves: Is there a right to maintain a political union
against the wishes of those who share it? Do we wish to defend that?
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